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Who Is Related To Social Agreement Theory

One of the striking features of relations between States, as opposed to relations between associates within a State, is the extent to which they occur in a context that seems to be approaching the metaphor of the state of nature. While, as we shall see, the problems associated with the theory of the social contract on questions of justice and legitimacy are exacerbated only by the extension of the theory of the social contract to the international context, the international context actually has certain advantages in terms of question of origin in general and Humean objection in particular. Before establishing international laws or treaties, states are situated together in two ways that reflect the Lockean or Hobbesian state of nature. First, there is no authority above the parties to an alleged treaty or international agreement. Second, the promulgation of such an agreement is based on the express consent of the parties concerned, and not on the tacit consent that Locke had to resort to in response to the problem identified at the beginning of this article: « Any person who has possession or enjoyment of any part of the dominions of a government thus gives his tacit consent and is as committed as possible to obey the laws of that government. that is what we are opposed to. [15] David Gauthier`s « neo-Hobbesian » theory holds that cooperation between two independent and selfish parties is in fact possible, especially when it comes to understanding morality and politics. [19] Gauthier points in particular to the advantages of cooperation between two parties when it comes to challenging the prisoner`s dilemma. He suggests that if two parties respected the originally agreed agreement and morality set out in the contract, both parties would achieve an optimal result. [19] [20] In his social contract model, factors such as trust, rationality and self-interest keep each party honest and prevent them from breaking the rules. [19] [20] We were able to distinguish negotiations from aggregation solutions.

Instead of looking for a result that (roughly speaking, the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution) divides the difference between different claims, we could try to aggregate individual rankings into a general social choice. Arrow`s theorem and the problems associated with the rules of social choice cast doubt on any claim that a particular type of aggregation is only rational: all have their flaws (Gaus 2008, chap. 5). Harsanyi (1977, chaps. 1 and 2; 1982) developed a theory of contracts similar to that of Rawls. Behind a veil of ignorance in which people do not know their identity under the contract, he assumes that rational entrepreneurs assume that it is just as likely that they will be a particular person. In addition, he argues that entrepreneurs can agree on comparisons of interpersonal benefits and will therefore opt for a contract that aggregates the benefit to the highest average (see also Mueller 2003, chap. 26). This, of course, depends on the assumption that there is an unversial measure that allows us to aggregate the utility functions of the parties. Binmore (2005) follows Harsanyi and Amartya Sen (2009, chap. 13) in arguing that interpersonal comparisons can be made at least in part for aggregation purposes […].